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Ante Novokmet* 
THE EPPO AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
A DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE: A SLIPPERY 
AREA OR A FINAL ARRANGEMENT?**
This paper examines the issue of judicial review of the decision 
to dismiss a case as envisaged in the Regulation on implementing 
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. In this respect, the institutional framework of the 
EPPO and the procedure for judicial review of a decision not to pros-
ecute is examined through comparative analyses of the Commission’s 
proposal of 2013 and the finally adopted text in the Regulation con-
sidering both theoretical and practical implications. Then, attention 
is drawn to the new mandate for the Permanent Chamber to dismiss a 
case, analysing the justification for lifting that decision at the EU level 
and considering the legal consequences that result from it. Finally, the 
real potential for the CJEU to review a decision to dismiss a case is 
scrutinised through an in-depth examination of the current normative 
framework of the Regulation and the TFEU, offering possible solutions 
to simplify and accelerate the proceedings before the CJEU.
Keywords: European Public Prosecutor’s Office, pre-trial proceed-
ings, decision not to prosecute, Permanent Chamber, judicial review, 
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the entry into force of Regulation 2017/1939/EU (hereinafter: the
Regulation)implementingenhancedcooperationontheestablishmentofthe





























5 Formoredetail,seeV.Mitsilegas,EU Criminal Law After Lisbon, Rights, Trust and the 
Transformation of Justice in Europe(HartPublishing,2016)pp104-119.
6 ForadifferentproposalfollowingtheinitialCommissionProposal,seeA.Damaskou,
“TheEuropeanPublic Prosecutor’sOffice:AGround-BreakingNew Institution of theEU
LegalOrder”(2015)6(1)New Journal of European Criminal Law,pp143–152.
7 SeeZ.Đurđević, ‘JudicialControl inPre-TrialCriminalProcedureConductedby the
EuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice’inK.Ligeti(ed),Towards a Prosecutor for the European 
Union(HartPublishing,2013)pp986–1010.
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certainty is raisedonce theEPPObegins toconduct investigations incountries thatdonot
knowsuchjudicialreview.A.Novokmet,‘TheEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOfficeandthe
JudicialReviewofCriminalProsecution’(2017)8(3)New Journal of European Criminal Law, 
pp374–402.
9 Even before theCommission’s proposal, Inghelram remarkably emphasised that “the
answer to thequestionofwhether judicial reviewofactsof theEPPOwillbeexercisedby
national courts or by EU courts cannot be given in terms of ‘either the one or the other’,
butwillundoubtedlybe‘both theoneandtheother’”.SeeJ.F.H.Inghelram,“Fundamental
Rights,theEuropeanAnti-FraudOffice(OLAF)andaEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice
(EPPO):SomeSelectedIssues”(2012)95(1)Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung 
und Rechtswissenschaft,p81.
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decisiontodismissacaseshallbepassedbythePermanentChamber,while









EPPO is considered a national body of criminal prosecution, and judicial
reviewisexercisedbythenationalcourts(Art.42(1)oftheRegulation).Such
reviewmaybeex ante or ex post,anditisexpectedthatnationalcourtswill




























a Prosecutor for the European Union(HartPublishing,2013)pp946–952.
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theCJEUtoachieveeffectivecontroloverthePermanentChamber’sdecision
todismissacase isaddressed,proposingconcretesolutions tosimplify the
processofjudicialreviewovertheEPPO’sdecisiontodismissacase.
2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EPPO AND  
THE REVIEW OF A DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE
2.1. The Commission’s proposal of 2013 – shortfall of an idea 










EPP)who needed to have a certain number of deputies (central level) and
EuropeandelegatedprosecutorsintheMemberStates(decentralisedlevel).16 
SuchanorganisationalstructureoftheEPPOwastoprovideastricthierarchy,
typical of the public prosecutor’s office in continental European countries,
wheretherearesubordinateaffiliationsoflowerpublicprosecutorstothoseat
13 SeeK.Ligeti,A.Marletta,“TheEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice:WhatRolefor
OLAFintheFuture?”inZ.Đurđević,E.IvičevićKaras(eds),European Criminal Procedure 
Law in Service of Protection of European Union Financial Interests: State of Play and Chal-
lenges(CroatianAssociationofEuropeanCriminalLaw,2015)pp55–60.
14 SeeS.White,“TowardsaDecentralisedEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice?”(2013)
4(1-2) New Journal of European Criminal Law,pp22–39.
15 Seeindetail:H.-H.Herrnfeld,“TheDraftRegulationontheEstablishmentoftheEuro-
peanPublicProsecutor’sOffice:IssuesofBalanceBetweentheProsecutionandtheDefence”




tionService?’(2013)4(1-2)New Journal of European Criminal Law,pp12–17.
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17 See, for example, the organisational structure of a public prosecutor’s office inGer-
many:S.M.Boyne,The German Prosecution Service(Springer,2014)pp35–38.
18 Eventhen,ConinsxwarnedthattheProposaldidnotclearlyelaboratehowtherelations
betweenEDPwould takeplaceandwhether theEPPOandEDPwouldmeet inacommon
structuretomakedecisions.M.Coninsx,“TheEuropeanCommission’sLegislativeProposal:
AnOverviewofItsMainCharacteristics”inL.H.Erkelens,A.W.H.Meij,M.Pawlik(eds),The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office: An Extended Arm or a Two-Headed Dragon? (Asser 
Press/Springer,2015)p32.
19 Ligeti explains it as a “close-knit steering structure at the supra-national level and a
decentralizednetworkofEDPinMemberStates”.K.Ligeti,‘TheEuropeanPublicProsecu-
tor’sOffice’inV.Mitsilegas,M.Bergström,T.Konstadinides(eds),Research Handbook on 
EU Criminal Law(EdwardElgarPublishing,2016)p488.
20 Pawlik andKlip rightly point out that individuals’ rights and freedoms can also be




ens,A.W.H.MeijandM.Pawlik(eds),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: An Extended 
Arm or a Two-Headed Dragon?(AsserPress/Springer,2015)p190.
21 A.Damaskou(n6)p139.
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ismarkedby the typicalprincipleofopportunity (expediency)asakindof
EPPOdiscretion (…itwould serve the purpose of proper administration of




defendant, thepossibilityof judicial reviewwasexplicitlyexcluded (Article
29(4)oftheProposal).
2.1.3. Judicial review of a decision to dismiss a case
When it comes to the judicial reviewof a decision to dismiss a case, it
shouldbenotedthattheProposalprovidedaverybroadlyprescribedgeneral
provisiononjudicialreview:“Whenadoptingproceduralmeasuresintheper-
formanceof its functions, theEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice shallbe
considered as a national authority for the purpose of judicial review” (Art.
36(1)oftheProposal).Thus,regardlessofwhethertheEPPOrenderedadeci-
sion toprosecuteor todismissacase, itwasa legalfiction thatEPPOwas
consideredanationalbodyintermsofcarryingoutjudicialreview.22Thiswas
substantiatedwiththeassertionthatactsundertakenbytheEPPOinthecourse
of its investigationsareclosely related to theprosecution,whichmayresult
therefromandhaveeffectsinthelegalorderoftheMemberStates.Inaddition,










a series of problematic situations opens up to which it is not easy to give
answers. Various EUMember States have completely different systems of
22 See also M. Böse, ‘Judicial Control of European Public Prosecutor’s Office’ in T.
Rafaraci,R.Belfiore (eds),EU Criminal Justice, Fundamental Rights, Transnational Pro-
ceedings and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(Springer,2018)p194.
23 Suchapositionof theCommission, in theory,hasbeencriticisedasargumentum ad 
absurdum.A.Erbežnik,“EuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice(EPPO)–TooMuch,TooSoon,
andWithoutLegitimacy?”(2015)5(2)European Criminal Law Review,p215.
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judicialcontrolofadecisiontodismissacase,andsomedonothavethemat
all,whichislargelydependentontheinstitutionalandorganisationalposition
of thepublic prosecutor’s office in the legal systems across theEU.24 Even 
thosecountriesthatknewacertainsystemofreviewofadecisiontodismissa








ingperpetratorsat theexpenseofEUfinancial interests incaseswhere the











Proposal, is the fact that it was entrusted to national courts.29 Due to the
above-mentionedlegalproblemsandconcerns,itisclearthatsuchasystemof
reviewwouldnothaveadequatelycometolifeintheEuropeancontext,which
24 Foracomparativeoverview,seeG.Gwladys,Public Prosecutors in the United States 
and Europe, A Comparative Analysis with Special Focus on Switzerland, France and Ger-
many(Springer,2014).











stitutionalIssues”inL.H.Erkelens,A.W.H.Meij,M.Pawlik(eds),The European Public Prose-
cutor’s Office: An Extended Arm or a Two-Headed Dragon?(AsserPress/Springer,2015)p69.
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2.2. Council regulation on enhanced cooperation –  
EU reality or inequality?
2.2.1. Structure and organisation of the EPPO 
With the entry into force of the Regulation, the EPPO’s institutional
arrangementshavetakenoncompletelynewcontoursthathavesignificantly
affectedthecurrentregulationofthejudicialreviewofadecisiontodismissa
case.TheEPPO is established as an indivisibleUnionbodyoperating as a
singleOfficewithadecentralisedstructure(Art.8(1)oftheRegulation).How-
ever,itshouldbenotedthatthestructureoftheEPPOhassignificantlychanged
in relation to theCommission’s Proposal.Namely, theRegulation departed
fromtheconceptofahierarchicallyorganisedcentralstructureandinstead
implementedamuchmoreintergovernmentalmodel.32Thisisclearlyvisible
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peanDelegatedProsecutors.Itshouldbenotedthattheimplementationofthe
College,whichwillbemadeupofoneEuropeanprosecutorperparticipating








sible for operational decision-making on initiating and withdrawing from
criminalprosecutionaswellasmonitoringanddirectingtheinvestigations.34
2.2.2. Dismissal of the case
FollowingtheneworganisationalstructureoftheEPPOatthecentralised
level, the Regulation envisaged the Permanent Chamber as the operational
componentoftheEPPOwhichwouldde factomakekeydecisionspertaining
totheinitiationandwithdrawalofcriminalprosecution(Art.10(3)oftheReg-





















37 SeeA.Klip,European Criminal Law(Intersentia,2016)pp516–517.
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draft decision proposed by the handling EDP (Recital 36). Therefore, the
38 SeealsoM.Caianiello,“TheDecision toDrop theCase:Res iudicataorTransferof
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validityofthedecisionsrenderedbythePretrialChamberwilllargelydepend
on the legality andobjectivity of theEDP’s proper prior assessment of the
fulfilmentofthelegalrequirementsforthedismissalofthecase.41






























NationalPerspective”inL.BachmaierWinter(ed),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: 
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on theCJEU,provided that thedecision todismissacase is challengedby
referring to Union law.47Ontheotherhand,awkwardstylizationoftheabove
provisionsmayleadtotheconclusionthatthedecisiontodismissacasecanbe











45 See A. Weyembergh, C. Briere, Towards a European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO). Study for the LIBE Committee(EuropeanParliament,2016)p38.
46 SeeLuchtmanandVervaele(n30)p144.
47 V. Mitsilegas, F. Giuffrida, “The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Human
Rights”inW.Geelhoed,L.H.Erkelens,A.W.H.Meij(eds),Shifting Perspectives on the Euro-







Handbook of European Criminal Procedure(Springer,2018)pp188-197.
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3. PERMANENT CHAMBER – RUBBER STAMP OR 


















the EPPO’sAdministrative Structure and Judicial Review” in L.H. Erkelens,A.W.H.Meij
andM.Pawlik(eds),The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: An Extended Arm or a Two-
Headed Dragon?(AsserPress/Springer,2015)p116.
52 Wade rightly points out that the Permanent Chamber is the “working heart” of the
EPPO.M.L.Wade,“TheEuropeanPublicProsecutor:ControversyExpressed inStructural
Form”inT.Rafaraci,R.Belfiore(eds),EU Criminal Justice. Fundamental Rights, Transna-
tional Proceedings and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Springer,2018)p173.
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ber,whenmaking itsdecision, shouldobserve that the investigationsof the
EPPOshould,asarule,leadtoprosecutioninthecompetentnationalcourtsin
caseswherethereissufficientevidenceandwherenolegalgroundbarsprose-
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between the Permanent Chamber and the EDP in this particular situation
wouldbe tobringthedisputedsituationto theCollegeof theEPPO,which
shouldthenimplementhierarchicalcontrolandsuggestbindingthefinaldis-










preconditions for criminal prosecution, the EDP has a chance to bring an
indictmentbefore thecourtwithout thepriorauthorisationofhis superiors.




Fulfilment”inT.Rafaraci,R.Belfiore(eds),EU Criminal Justice. Fundamental Rights, Trans-
national Proceedings and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office(Springer,2018)p161.
57 Ligety andMarletta warn that such a complex relationship between the Permanent




Accusation] (2015) Hrvatsko udruženje za kaznene znanosti i praksu, Ministarstvo unutarnjih 
poslova Republike Hrvatske, Sveučilište Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku, Pravni fakultet 
Osijek, Zagreb,pp252–262,281–290,315–323,474–521.
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4. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DECISION TO DISMISS A CASE 


































The European Public Prosecutor’s Office: The Challenges Ahead(Springer,2018)p223.
61 See inparticularA.MartínezSantos, “TheStatusof Independenceof theEuropean
PublicProsecutor’sOfficeandItsGuarantees”inL.BachmaierWinter(ed),The European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office: The Challenges Ahead(Springer,2018)pp1–25.
62 Ruggieri doubtswhether internal oversight by thePermanentChamber is enough to
avoidtheriskofuncontrolledinactionbytheEPPO.Ruggieri(n60)p221.
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AsthePermanentChamber’sdecisiontodismissacasewouldpractically






























crime victims (Art. 39(4) of theRegulation), there is a significant practical




Reviewvis avis theEUCitizen” (2016)7(2)New Journal of European Criminal Law, pp
175–189.
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crime,whereas the decision to dismiss a case should be subject to judicial
reviewinaccordancewithArt.263(4)TFEUinsofarasitiscontesteddirectly












status”.66 Inorder to assignan“identifiable status” to a certainperson, two












it-making.69 If theymeet these criteria, their “recognized status” should be
guaranteedregardlessoftheirearlierengagementduringthepre-trialproce-














A. Novokmet: The EPPO and Judicial Review of a Decision not to Prosecute: a Slippery Area or...













in institutingproceedingsbefore theCJEUagainstanactaddressed to that






theEUshouldnotallowitself the luxury that the interestofprosecutionof
such serious criminal offences, because of the erroneous judgments of the
EPPO,wouldbejeopardisedbyconferringtheinitiationofjudicialreviewto
anaturalor legalpersonon theadditionalcondition that thatdecision isof
directandindividualconcerntothem,75especiallybecausethereisalwaysa
















decide in the futurewith respect to theEPPO’s activitiesmaynot be thewisest course of
action.LuchtmanandVervaele(n30)p146.
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demonstrate the existence of their legitimate interest in enforcing judicial
reviewtodismissacase.
4.3. Speedy decision-making process 
One of the qualities every systemof judicial review needs inmaking a
decisiontodismissacaseisaquickremedialprocedure.Prescribingtoomany
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the decision todismiss a case simultaneously creates thenegative effect of
narrowingthepossibilitiesfordemocraticcontroloverthelegalityofcriminal































to dismiss a case inMember States based on the principle of opportunity (expediency) of
criminalprosecution,seeW.Geelhoed,“EmbeddingtheEuropeanPublicProsecutor’sOffice
inJurisdictionswithaWideScopeofProsecutorialDiscretion:TheDutchExample” inC.
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4.4.  A possible shift towards ex officio judicial review of  






















and punishment of the perpetrator, the benefit of this legal path cannot be
expected,especiallyconsideringthelargenumberofcasesthatwillberesolved





made amistake in its decision but also the legal basis for establishing ius 
standibeforetheCJEU.Moreover,citizenswillhavefinancialandtime-con-







(2016) 12(1) Utrecht Law Review,pp86–108.
156
A. Novokmet: The EPPO and Judicial Review of a Decision not to Prosecute: a Slippery Area or...















the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute).86 
Althoughtherationaleandfoundationsforestablishingthesetwopromotersof
collective (social) interest inpunishing theperpetratorsof themost serious
criminaloffencescannotbecompared,becausetheirconceptualbasisiscom-





















torial’or‘Mixed’?”inM.Bohlander(ed),International Criminal Justice: A Critical Analysis 
of Institutions and Procedures (CameronMay,2007)pp451–452.
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suchnegativedecisions,shouldcommenceanex officio review of a decision 
nottoprosecute;thus,thedecisionoftheOTPshallbeeffectiveonlyifcon-























89 Formore detail, seeW.Schabas, “ProsecutorialDiscretion v. JudicialActivism at the
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cratic,financial, and timedifficultiesdiscourage themfromdoing thisduly
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mission uncritically proposed that judicial review over the decision not to






greeted with great relief. This is evident from the fact that the regulation
explicitly prescribed that theCJEU is competent to control the decision to
dismissacase.Thishasconfirmed foranumberofcritics in scientificand
professional circles that theEPPO should be considered as anEUbody of
criminal prosecution for thepurposeof judicial review.Thishas alsobeen












process of proving ius standi before theCJEU,which deters citizens from
seekingtobeaprotectorofthefinancialinterestsoftheEUwhentheEPPO
hasnotfulfilleditsstatutoryduty.
Hence,thispaperproposesex officio judicial review of a decision to dis-
missacase.Thissolutionisnotnewandhasalreadybeenrecognisedinthe
work of another supranational body of criminal prosecution at the interna-
tional level, i.e., theProsecutorof the ICC. It isclear that it isdifficultand
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Ovaj rad razmatra problematiku sudske kontrole odluke europskog javnog tužitelja da 
odustaneodkaznenogprogonakakojepredviđenoUredbomoprovedbipojačanesuradnje
u vezi s osnivanjemUreda europskog javnog tužitelja.Najprije se analizira institucionalni
okvirUredaEJT-a ipostupakza sudskukontroluodlukeoodustankuodkaznenogprogo-
nausporednimanalizamaprijedlogaUredbeiz2013.godineikonačnousvojenogteksta,pri
čemuseuzimajuuobzirteorijskeipraktičneimplikacije.Zatimseskrećepozornostnanovu
nadležnostStalnogvijećadadoneseodlukuoodustankuodkaznenogprogonarazmatranjem
opravdanostiuzdizanjateodlukenaeuropskurazinutepravnihposljedicakojeiznjeproiz-
laze.NaposljetkusekritičkomanalizomaktualnognormativnogokviraUredbeiUgovorao
funkcioniranjuEuropskeunijepropitujestvarnipotencijalSudaEuropskeunijedakontrolira
odlukeoodustankuodkaznenogprogonatesedajuodređeniprijedlozide lege ferenda.
Ključneriječi:Uredeuropskogjavnogtužitelja,prethodnikaznenipostupak,odustanakod
kaznenogprogona,Stalnovijeće,sudskakontrola,SudEuropskeunije
